2010 March 1 Weekly Update

March 6th, 2010

This week has concluded with only one rumor of a Dust Collector fire, a Wood Pellet Plant in Australia suffering a dust explosion, and a Wood Mill in Oklahoma sustaining damage from a sawdust fire.  Generally speaking, it has been a safe week.

My next efforts will be to compile a list of Mill Accidents and Dry Dust Collector Accidents.  These are the most popular Combustible Dust related incidents on record.  We need to build a list to find the most common attributes of such events.

I attended and spoke at the American Coal Council’s Spring Conference, regarding the mounting cost of Mining Regulations (both Safety and Environmentally related).  Also, the effect of Power Generation Regulations which have an effect on coal mining as a continuing and feasible venture.  It is getting more and more difficult to justify until there is a greater understanding of Power Diversity.  A speaker from the Department of Energy stated that Coal Fired Power continues to be a vital and important piece of our power diversification plan, and that Coal Fired Power specifically has a strong case for continuing to have a place in the power source lineup.  He stated that it is not an option to specifically remove coal from our future power generation profile.

Please comment if you have anything to contribute to this discussion.

Have a safe week!

Statement of CSB Investigators re: Kleen River Accident

March 1st, 2010


This email is contained on our website in hopes that all who read it will forward to others in your Utility.  There are many Combined Cycle Natural Gas Unit’s being commissioned.  It is hoped that everyone will step back and either assist the CSB in their assembly of Recommendations, or just reconsider practices going forward.  If there are those who wish to help the CSB in their efforts, please call Mark Collett at (630) 740-9134.

Statement of CSB Investigations Supervisor Don Holmstrom Updating the Public on the CSB’s Investigation of the Catastrophic Accident at Kleen Energy, Middletown, Connecticut

Embargoed Until 11:00 a.m. Eastern Standard Time

Thursday, February 25, 2010

 Good morning I am CSB Lead Investigator Don Holmstrom; thank you for coming to this CSB news conference.  The Chemical Safety Board is an independent federal agency that investigates and reports to the public on the causes of major chemical accidents at industrial sites across the country. The CSB is headed by five board members appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate.

 The CSB’s reports and safety recommendations to Congress, federal and state regulators, and industry are widely followed and applied throughout the United States. Our mission is to prevent disastrous accidents of the kind that occurred here less than three weeks ago.

 The safety issues raised by this accident are not limited to Connecticut. These issues are larger than any particular company, facility, or individual. The U.S. has embarked an ambitious construction effort for new natural gas power plants. Thousands and thousands of workers across the country will be involved in constructing these plants. The safety of these workers and the nation’s energy independence are at stake as these gas-fired plants are built over the next 20 years.

 The CSB has a team of ten here investigating at the Kleen Energy accident site. On behalf of all of us at the CSB, we extend our deepest condolences to the families of Ronald Crabb, Peter Chepulis, Raymond Dobratz, Kenneth Haskell, Christopher Walters and Roy Rushton. The goal of the CSB investigation is that terrible accidents like this will not happen again and that no families will suffer such tremendous losses in the future. 

 The CSB team arrived at the site on February 8th. Since that time, the CSB team has conducted a large number of interviews, reviewed documents, and closely examined the accident site on numerous occasions. We appreciate the outstanding cooperation from the workers at this facility, who despite living through such a horrible ordeal have provided valuable information to CSB investigators.

 This accident occurred during a planned work activity to clean debris from natural gas pipes at the plant. To remove the debris, workers used natural gas at a high pressure of approximately 650 pounds per square inch. The high velocity of the natural gas flow was intended to remove any debris in the new piping. At pre-determined locations, this gas was vented to the atmosphere through open pipe ends which were located less than 20 feet off the ground. These vents were adjacent to the main power generation building and along the south wall. The open pipe ends are visible here in the photographs.

 You can actually see the high-pressure gas venting out of one of these open pipe ends in this photograph taken a short time before the accident on February 7. 

 This cleaning practice is known within the natural gas power industry as a “gas blow.” Industry personnel have indicated to CSB investigators that gas blows are a common practice during the commissioning of new or modified gas pipes at their facilities. 

 CSB investigators have reviewed gas utility records for the morning of the accident. These records together with written pipe cleaning procedures and witness testimony confirm that the gas blows occurred intermittently over the course of the morning. At the same time that gas blows were underway, there were potential ignition sources present in the surrounding area, including inside the power plant building.   There were many construction-related activities underway inside the building.

 Determining the exact ignition source is not a major focus of our investigation at this point. In most industrial worksites, ignition sources are abundant and efforts at accident prevention focus first and foremost on avoiding or controlling the release of flammable gas or vapor.

 Initial calculations by CSB investigators reveal that approximately 400,000 standard cubic feet of gas were released to the atmosphere near the building in the final ten minutes before the blast.

 That is enough natural gas to fill the entire volume of a pro-basketball arena with an explosive natural gas-air mixture, from the floor to the ceiling.

 This gas was released into a congested area next to the power block building. This congested area likely slowed the dispersion of the gas. The gas built up above the lower explosive limit of approximately 4% in air and was ignited by an undetermined ignition source.

 In the days since the accident, companies and safety regulators from around the world have contacted the CSB asking about the circumstances of this devastating accident. Some companies, including a power plant here in the region, indicated that they themselves have been planning similar gas blows as part of commissioning pipes in the very near future.

 A major focus of the CSB investigation is to determine what regulations, codes, and good practices might apply to these gas blows. To this point, no specific codes have been identified, but we are continuing our research. 

 In the meantime, we strongly caution natural gas power plants and other industries against the venting of high-pressure natural gas in or near work sites. This practice, although common, is inherently unsafe.

 The CSB is investigating possible alternatives to this practice, including the use of air, steam, nitrogen, or water or the use of combustion devices to safely destroy the gas.  Combustion devices like flares can safely burn up flammable gas or vapor, preventing the possibility of an explosion.

 Recommending safer alternatives will be a primary focus of the CSB investigation as we move forward.

Just three days prior to this tragic accident, the Chemical Safety Board recommended changes to the National Fuel Gas Code to prevent disastrous explosions involving gas purging. We note with great appreciation that just yesterday, at a meeting in San Francisco, the NFPA panel responsible for the fuel gas code voted to move forward with the CSB’s recommendations to make purging practices safer at work sites across America. These provisions will apply at hundreds of thousands of facilities, once fully adopted.

The type of purging described in that code is different from the gas blows used in the power industry, and power plants remain exempt from the national fuel gas code. However, gas purging as defined in the code has certain similarities to gas blows, in that gas is applied at one end of a pipe and gas is intentionally vented at the other end to the atmosphere.

There is an underlying common theme among the tragic accidents at Kleen Energy, the ConAgra Slim Jim plant in North Carolina, the Ford River Rouge power plant in Michigan, the Hilton Hotel in San Diego, and many other purging-related accidents. Companies must ensure that flammable gases are not vented into close proximity with ignition sources and workers. That is a vital safety message from all these tragedies.

We encourage the gas power industry to closely study the very positive actions recommended by the NFPA and the American Gas Association committees yesterday.  The CSB investigation will focus on determining what permanent changes in standards or practices are needed to prevent future accidents involving gas blows.

Thank you for attending this morning and we will be happy to answer questions from members of the media. Please state your name and affiliation with your questions. 

OSHA Completes its Second Pair of Stakeholder Meetings in Atlanta

February 28th, 2010

2010 Feb 27 WEEKLY UPDATE

February 27th, 2010

Wyoming Legislature introduces HB.0093 (http://legisweb.state.wy.us/2010/Introduced/HB0093.pdf), Protecting American Worker’s Act, bringing civil penalties to the level currently being considered at the Federal level, i.e. S.1580. 

While the Healthcare Issue occupies the time and efforts of lawmakers in Washington DC, consideration of lawmaking i.e. HR.2067 and S.1580 is unlikely.  Once Washington DC gets on with business, this lawmaking will be hotly debated between Worker Advocacy Groups/Agencies/Unions and some Corporations.  The Federal lawmaking would include: increasing civil penalties,  bring Federal, State, and Local entities under OSHA (no longer exempt), would protect whistle blowers, and enable the ability to prosecute and imprison any management up the chain of ownership. 

Mill and Dust Collector Events.  This past 10 days there have been explosions involving Mill Puff’s that propagated through the Bunker Room, and Dry Dust Collector Deflagrations.  These two types of incidents are far to popular these days.  And while we do not serve as a news agency reporting such items, we will refer you to them once they have become items published by the Corporations for the use of other Company’s.  In the meantime, be especially mindful of such hazards.

Starch Manufacturer Combustible Dust Explosion feared.  An explosion this past week in China left 19 dead, 49 injured, 8 seriously, when flammable dust ignited in a Starch and Glucose factory where 3,300 employee’s work.     

Have a safe week!


2010 Feb 22 WEEKLY UPDATE

February 22nd, 2010

UPDATES:  These news items and statements of pressing issues regarding safety and compliance for Coal-fired Power Generation, are provided by Plant Professionals to continue “shedding light” on items which are critical to the Utility Practitioner, be it Operations, Maintenance, Management, Engineering, Safety, etc.

Some of these items may seem a bit disconnected, but contribute to our discovery of current affairs, OSHA focus, Incidents, etc.

OSHA Compliance Fines (from a paraphrased recent news article):  OSHA has stepped up efforts to penalize violators after similar finely divided dust of different components caused an Imperial Sugar plant explosion in 2008 that killed 14 people.  This auto parts manufacturer (X Company) was hit with $70,000 in fines by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. An October inspection revealed combustible dust in a storage area. OSHA also cited the plant for failing to limit dust exposure to employees, exposing workers to fall hazards, failing to have a respiratory protection program, and failing to ensure there were lockout devices to trap energy during equipment maintenance.

X Company has been (1)fined for the dust and other violations before. Last March, an inspection revealed there was dust, employee exposure to formaldehyde, and other particles, among other health and safety violations. The company paid $135,000 in fines for those violations.  (2) A spokesman allowed to speak for X Company says they hired a private firm to clean up the dust last year. This time, the company is contesting the penalties. They hope to work with OSHA to eliminate the fines, because (3) they thought they had done enough.

“These are small pockets of scraps,” said the spokesman of the Chamber of Commerce. “They can combust. (4) The good thing is it’s a non-combustible building.”

The Plant Manager did release a statement:  “On Monday, February 8, 2010, X Company received notice from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) of potential safety hazards noted by an OSHA inspector during a visit in October of 2009. Worker safety is an issue of paramount importance to (X Company), and so interim steps were put in place to address the concerns, and an immediate investigation of items listed in the OSHA notice was commenced, and is in progress. X Company has asked for an immediate conference with the Area Director of OSHA in order to clarify conclusions reached in the notice, and discuss an agreement that will ensure the safest possible work environments at” X Company’s Facilities.

“(We want) to make sure where the disconnect is (with OSHA),” said the Plant Manager. “Correct it for the safety of their employees.”

That disconnect could come from the federal standard to regulate the dust. (5) There isn’t one. The U.S. Chemical Safety Board advises OSHA but does not have the power to regulate. OSHA is currently working on setting a federal standard for combustible dust.

Said…County Fire Chief…(of Combustible Dust): “It has the potential to create an explosion, just like a bomb going off.”

The fire department says it has responded to (6) Three or four fires at the company over the past two or three years. They are usually small fires, said (the Fire Chief), (7) contained within X Company’s duct system. It’s not known whether dust played a role in the fires.

“If you can get it (8) ventilatedand, get the dust removed, then the danger is removed,” added (the Fire Chief).

Said a Spokesman: ”They’ve got interior functions that draw the dust out. They’re working on it to get it totally perfect for a safety standard.”

X Company was also fined for OSHA violations in 2006.  Because of the Imperial Sugar blast, OSHA could be trying to send a message. They fined Imperial $9,000,000 after it was determined dust was the cause.

OSHA told (news reporters) that (9) “they must work within the resources they have”. They (10) do not always do follow-up inspections on violations and must depend on companies to correct the problems that are found.

This paraphrased article holds several valuable lessons within:

  1. Once you have been fined, repeat violations are a focus of OSHA.  There is additional risk of inspection, increased several times when repeat violations are found.
  2. Don’t allow the local Chamber of Commerce to be your spokesperson.  Best case is to have an Information Officer or Public Relations Firm do your talking.  A recent Mine Disaster was madeseveral times more hurtful and controversial because the President & CEO did not follow this simple concept.  Judging from the poor understanding of the “spokesman” in this article, that lack of knowledge only caused X Company to appear more culpable when they may not have deserved it.
  3. Here is a quiz question:  Is it adequate for you to simply think you have “done enough”?  If you feel you have, say you have.  If you feel you have not, don’t say you “thought” you had.  “Thought” is not a functional word in such affairs.
  4. Is it a good thing that the building was non-combustible.  Sure.  Does it have value when talking about the potential for explosion from process material?  No.  The hazard here is explosion.
  5. When referring to existence of an actionable dust standard, the comment was:  “there isn’t one”.  Showing ignorance such as this is damning to a company.  In October 2007 and revised in March 2008, OSHA launched a National Emphasis Program (quick standard) on Combustible Dust.  It is a good document, but more importantly, it is actionable by OSHA Federal and State entities.  While a new standard is being written at this time, claiming “there isn’t one” is a false statement.
  6. “Three or four fires at the company over the past two or three years” is not a trivial matter.  First of all, have you read the recently published Recordkeeping NEP?  Are your fires recorded?  Second of all, never try to trivialize the meaning or potential a fire (primary event) brings to any facility.
  7. If there is a fire in a duct system, the odds of it being dust related are astronomically in favor.  What else would it be?
  8. Make sure you are aware of the new standard for expectations of duct air velocity, which has been raised to 35,000 ft/min. to keep dust suspended, thus preventing dust from laying down on the floor of the duct.
  9. Telling OSHA that you must work “within the resources you have”, suggests a lack of innovation on better ways to “skin the cat”.  You are either telling OSHA that you don’t/won’t expend the manpower (lack of committment), or you are showing your lack of a “good faith effort” in finding solutions.
  10. The current Combustible Dust NEP requires each company/facility to protect the safety and life of workers by insuring compliance with the NEP and it’s referenced documents (mostly NFPA).  One of the most critical documents referenced in the NEP is NFPA 654, which establishes the %of total area coverage and a certain thickness.  If visited by OSHA, ask for their expectations regarding allowable thickness.  Otherwise, follow the suggestions given in 654 and inspect regularly to insure that dust limits are not exceeded.  The future of the OSHA Combustible Dust Standards will see an expectation of regular Internal Assessments regarding any gap between standards and actual conditions.  At the very least, dust levels and efforts to elliminate the accumulation (containment), or mitigation should be taken seriously every shift of operation.

 

OSHA Completes its Second Pair of Stakeholder Meetings in Atlanta:  See my post of the same title to find detailed notes of this event.


OSHA Widows of miners killed in disaster file suit in U.S.  This article comes to us courtesy of Reuters, Feb 19.  It is included to call attention regarding the powerful connection between methane primary events and the devastating secondary explosion of Combustible Dust (coal) that often occurs.  Within the past several months, there has been a similar incident which occured at a Power Generation Facility in the US.  It started with a methane explosion in the underground Coal Stockpile Reclaim Tunnel, which sonically caused dispersion of dust from the cable trays, pipe racks, and conveyor frame, resulting in an explosion which engulfed the entire tunnel and conveyor structure sloping upward away from the reclaim tunnel.  While this article is from the mining industry, it has application in our Utility Coal Industry.  NOTE:  The PRB Coal User’s Group Conference to be held in Baltimore, MD on May 17 – 20, 2010, features a presentation on the aforementioned explosion at a Power Generation Reclaim Tunnel.

MEXICO CITY, Feb 19 (Reuters) – Widows of Mexican miners killed by an explosion in a coal mine in 2006 are suing owner Grupo Mexico for $300 million in a U.S. court, the United Steelworkers Union representing the women said on Friday

Sixty-five miners were killed in a pre-dawn explosion of methane gas and coal dust which tore throughout the the Pasta de Conchos mine in Mexico’s northern state of Coahuila, trapping some workers almost 1.5 miles (2.5 km) underground.

The blast sent temperatures soaring above 1,100 Fahrenheit (600 Celsius) and filled mine shafts and tunnels with methane and carbon monoxide as well as collapsed rock.

The Steelworkers Union is arguing, on behalf of three widows, that Grupo Mexico (GMEXICOB.MX) knew of the potential dangers and was negligent. The union believes more relatives could join the suit.

“The (company) knew that there were high levels of methane gas, combustible dust and a lack of ventilation that was creating a perfect storm for the very type of disaster that did happen and they did nothing,” said the Steelworkers lead counsel Dan Kovalik.

Grupo Mexico said it did not yet have any comment on the case, which was filed on Friday in a U.S. District Court in Phoenix, Arizona, where Grupo Mexico has offices.

The company already faced a Mexican judge over the disaster but the 2007 manslaughter trial ended with payouts of about $16,500 to each family.

Grupo Mexico has been hit by repeated labor problems at its Mexican mines, including a 2-1/2 year strike at its largest copper pit Cananea that began over health and safety concerns. [ID:nN18198161] (Reporting by Mica Rosenberg; Editing by Lisa Shumaker)


Kleen River Gas Plant Explosion

There are parrallels which are worth noting, between the Coal Fueled Power Generation Industry and the recent Kleen River Gas Explosion in Conneticut.  Those parrallels will yeild additional points of safety and technical best practices which can be used in our industry.  However, the parrallel I wish to identify is that of being informed and noting any recent updates from agencies such as the Chemical Safety Board (CSB), OSHA, or MSHA.  Such warnings can also come from Associations and User’s Groups who publish Best Practices.  

Only three days before the massive explosion that killed at least five workers at a newly constructed natural gas plant in Middletown, Conn., the US Chemical Safety Board (CSB) issued urgent new recommendations on how to prevent explosions when handling or purging natural gas pipelines.

It is too soon to know what happened at Kleen Energy Systems. But workers at the site were reportedly purging a natural gas pipeline prior to the explosion.

In its documentation detailing why it was recommending new safety standards, the CSB cited incidents that show striking similarities to the Connecticut disaster. In at least seven incidents since 1997, workers have died and large-scale damage has been done to buildings as a result of pipelines being purged in an enclosed area.

“We have far more incidents in the database than the half dozen that we have listed,” says Sandy Gilmour, a CSB spokesman. “The incidents listed were just the ones that jumped out to our investigators, because they were severe cases or because they could be documented.”

I have worked with the CSB on occasion, and find them to be dedicated to the cause of safety and hazard prevention.  They are not consumed with writing fines (they DON’T levy fines), rather they are consumed with finding causes, commonality, and methods by which Industries can be notified of unknown or little-known hazards.

We certainly should pay close attention to their findings, videos, papers, etc.  Mr. Bresland, Director of the CSB will be speaking at the PRB Coal User’s Group Conference on May 18, 2010, in regards to Combustible Dust.  OSHA leadership will also be speaking.

2010 Feb 15 WEEKLY UPDATE

February 22nd, 2010

Progress on the new ComDust Standard continues to be on-schedule, with Stakeholder Meetings to be held February 17th and will continue April 21st in Chicago.  All written input from industry and the public has been submitted since January 19, hence, we should start hearing some rumblings regarding OSHA’s interpretation of that input.

In the meantime, the Kleen River Natural Gas Explosion and its unfortunate toll weighs heavily on all of us.  Perhaps we should hold a meeting with key operations and  engineering personnel and take a moment to consider areas where we could be exposed to risk and injury.  Sometimes, a general meeting with no pre-established outline brings thoughts that have not been discussed before.  Then, a closing safety meeting could include the concept of taking time-out before each work task or item, to specifically consider the hazards.  If there are any doubts or questions, elevate the discussion to the next level of management, and discuss the hazard and the mitigating actions to elliminate the risk.


Global Warming

Perhaps this could be an image of Robert Kennedy Jr. warning the schoolchildren last year about the "future without snow" in Maryland.

Last week’s planned discussion regarding OSHA’s progress on safety were cancelled due to the weather.  I could not help from posting this picture.  Sorry for the Editorializing.


Next OSHA Combustible Dust ANPR Stakeholder Meetings to be April 21, 2010 at Chicago’s O’hare Crowne Plaza

February 17th, 2010

Rulemaking Flowsheet

January 15th, 2010

Combustible Dust ANPR 12/2009 Stakeholder Mtg. Notes

January 15th, 2010

Welcome to our new Interchange feature!

December 21st, 2009

Our new Compliance Interchange is a tool to give you the latest news and events related to our industry. We hope you find it useful in keeping up-to-date on the latest information regarding all governmental regulation. By staying directly involved with what is going on in Washington, P2 is committed to keeping current on all actionable and proposed madates. Our goal is to pass on this information to our clients to keep you informed too.